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Abstract 
 
Expansionary fiscal contractions were first illustrated by several fiscal episodes that occurred 
in Europe during the 1980s. This paper suggests a simple analytical textbook model that 
encompasses both Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. In such a context, 
the possibility of expansionary fiscal contractions is linked to the responsiveness of the risk 
premium of domestic interest rates to the budgetary position of the government and to the 
existence of credit-rationed consumers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
While studying the fiscal consolidations that occurred in Denmark and in Ireland in the 
1980s, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) documented the possibility of expansionary fiscal 
contractions. In a nutshell, an increase of public expenditures might cast doubts on the 
sustainability of fiscal policy and on the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and one may observe 
an increase of private saving and a reduction of private consumption. By the opposite 
reasoning, a reduction of public spending may induce an increase in private consumption. 
The aforementioned fiscal episodes exemplified also the relevance of the Ricardian 
equivalence idea.  
 
Among the available empirical evidence on expansionary fiscal consolidations there is 
significant disagreement. Nevertheless, there seems to be some evidence that the existence of 
non-Keynesian effects may well depend upon the size and the persistence of the fiscal 
adjustment. The composition of the adjustment is also relevant, that is, to what degree the 
fiscal contraction is based on tax increases and public investment or consumption cuts.1  
 
This paper suggests an avenue for expansionary fiscal contractions in a simple analytical 
textbook model that encompasses both Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. 
The possibility of expansionary fiscal contractions is linked to the responsiveness of interest 
rates to fiscal policy and to the existence of rationed consumers. Section two briefly offers 
some rational background regarding expansionary fiscal contractions. The analytical model 
and the results are presented in section three and section four is a conclusion. 
 
2. Some background on expansionary fiscal contractions 
 
The discussion on expansionary fiscal consolidations could be traced back to Barro and the 
Ricardian Equivalence question, an expression apparently coined by Buchanan (1976). Even 
though the first formal exposition is credited to Barro (1974), the theoretical rational behind 
the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis was originally stated by Ricardo (1817).2 
                                                          
1 For empirical evidence on cross-country analysis see Alesina and Perotti (1995), McDermott and Wescott 
(1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1999), Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Heylen and Everaert 
(2000), EC (2003), Giudice et al. (2004), and Afonso (2006). 
2 Interestingly Barro (1998) says: “My excuse for being blissfully ignorant in 1973 of Ricardo' s contribution is 
that I was a young, non-tenured faculty member with inadequate graduate training from Harvard University.” 
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The key idea behind Ricardian Equivalence is that consumers are linked by intergenerational 
altruism, and also that they have a fairly good perception about the future taxes needed to 
repay eventual present increases in government debt. Therefore, consumer’s net wealth 
would be invariant between more debt today and more taxes tomorrow. Budget deficits 
would have no real effects and fiscal policy would be unable to change private consumption, 
a different notion from the one sustained by Keynes. In a limit situation, when the 
government cuts taxes, consumers just save more, for instance placing money in time deposit 
accounts, in order to help pay the higher future taxes, and the level of consumption would 
remain unchanged. 
 
Another point worthwhile making is that, intuitively, if an increase in public spending casts 
some doubts on the sustainability of fiscal policy and on the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
one may observe an increase of private saving and a reduction of private consumption.3 
Conversely, an increase in taxes, while shifting some of the tax burden from future 
generations to the present generations, and contributing to reduce current private 
consumption, may also diminish uncertainty about the future conduction of fiscal policy. 
Therefore, consumers can reduce accumulated saving, some of which was probably set up as 
a precaution to meet future tax increases. This second effect may be the prevailing one, when 
for instance there is already a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the possibility of the so-
called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy can arise. 
 
In addition, Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997) maintain that if the fiscal consolidation 
appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, 
there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption. 
Furthermore, the reduction of the government borrowing requirements diminishes the risk 
premium associated with public debt issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and 
allows the crowding-in of private investment. However, if consumers do not think that the 
fiscal consolidation is credible, then the customary negative Keynesian effect on consumption 
will prevail.4  
 
                                                          
3 Regarding the sustainability of fiscal policies in the European Union see, for instance, Afonso (2005). 
4 Bertola and Drazen (1993), Barry and Devereux (1995) and Perotti (1999) present several theoretical 
explanations concerning the possible existence of non-Keynesian effects. 
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On the other hand, McDermott and Wescott (1996) discuss the possibility of a wealth effect 
as an explanation to the existence of a non-Keynesian transmission channel of fiscal policy. 
Again, if there are doubts concerning the sustainability of fiscal policy, a fiscal consolidation 
may be a factor in favour of the reduction of interest rates. This may in turn, help increase the 
market value of the assets portfolios held by the consumers, and the implicit wealth effect 
would allow the increase of aggregate demand. 
 
Moreover, a fiscal consolidation may contribute to improve the long-term financing 
conditions of a given government by reducing its demand for financing in the capital markets. 
This can decrease potentially existing crowding out effects created by the government’s 
demand for capital, and reduce the risk premium attached to government debt. Such effects 
could play a role in increasing private investment  
 
In addition, the fact that an increase in public expenditure will have typical Keynesian effects 
when the level of public debt or of the budget deficit is small. If a country has an important 
budget deficit or a very high debt-to-GDP ratio, a fiscal consolidation may well produce the 
non-Keynesian effects discussed above. 
 
3. Model and results 
 
One should be aware that, in general, a public spending cut back may have non-Keynesian 
results when the impact is large enough in order to change future expectations about future 
budget deficits and public debt evolution. Indeed, such result is easily shown in 
straightforward formulations.5  
 
The proposed formal analysis in this paper uses a simple two period model for a small 
economy, with income in each year given by 
 
 )(
__
iiiiii MXIGCY −+++=  (1) 
 
                                                          
5 In a simple Keynesian framework, with the standard notation and relations, IGCY ++= , _GG = , TYY d −= , 
tYT =  and dcYC = , a fiscal policy contraction may lead to an output expansion. In fact, an increase of the 
budget surplus produces an output increase if the following two conditions are fulfilled: ).1/(1/ tTGc −<∆∆<  
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where Yi is income; Ci is private consumption; 
_
iG are exogenous public expenditures, 
_
iX are 
exports, also exogenous, Mi are imports, and Ii is investment, with i = 1, 2. 
 
The domestic interest rate r depends on the foreign interest rate, and it should also reflect the 
country specific risk conditions, which may be related to the public revenues that the 
government has available to finance the deficit. McDermott and Westcott (1996) argue that 
fiscal contractions (for instance, an increase of public revenues) contribute to lower the 
interest rate risk premium and to increase investment. In other words, the less significant 
those public revenues are, the more pressured the government is to find credit in the capital 
markets, paying therefore higher interest rates. The domestic interest rate could then be seen 
as a positive function of the budget deficit or, alternatively, as a decreasing function of the tax 
revenues.  
 
For instance, Artus (1997) observed that the European countries with the higher interest rate 
differentials with reference to Germany were the countries with the more significant budget 
deficits. Cebula (1997) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) find empirical evidence for the US 
that budget deficits and government debt have a significant and positive effect on long-run 
interest rates. Ibrahim and Kumah (1997) find evidence that an increase in the budget deficit 
leads to an increase of the short run interest rate differential, vis-à-vis the US, in the UK, 
Japan and Sweden. See also Rose and Hakes (1995) concerning the relationship between 
deficits and interest rates. Additionally, Laubach (2003) finds that a one-percentage point 
increase in the projected US deficit-to-GDP ratio is estimated to raise long-term interest rates 
by some 25 basis points. 
 
On the other hand, Faini (2004) finds some evidence that, after the set up of the European 
Monetary Union, interest rate spillovers are larger for high-debt countries with unsustainable 
fiscal policies. Therefore, an interest rate reduction would raise the market value of the assets 
owned by the households. If this wealth effect is higher than the negative effect that the fiscal 
consolidation has on aggregate demand, then the fiscal contraction may result in a net 
increase of private consumption. 
 
One may then assume the possibility of a negative relation between the domestic interest rate 
and public revenues and put differently, a negative link between domestic interest rate and 
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taxes. With the existence of such risk-premium factor that is increasing in the budget deficit, 
the interest rate is given by 
 
 * 1( )r r f T= +  (2) 
 
where r* is the foreign interest rate and T1 the tax revenues, with 1/ 0r T∂ ∂ < . Additionally, 
one also assumes that investment depends negatively on the interest rate. 
 
In each period the government fulfils its budget constraint, which can be written respectively 
for periods 1 and 2 as 
 
 
_
111 GBT =+ , (3) 
 
 
_
2 1 2T B G− = . (4) 
 
Assume also that outside public debt there is no other source of deficit financing. The 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint may then be written as 
 
 
_
_
2 2
1 11 1
T GT G
r r
+ = ++ + . (5) 
 
Presuming also there is a certain fraction of consumers, λ, that face liquidity constraints, that 
is, they consume in each period their entire disposable income. On the other hand, a fraction 
(1−λ) of consumers does not face such restrictions, which may imply that they have access to 
the credit market. For this group of consumers consumption reflects their permanent 
disposable income, and as a result is inversely related to the interest rate due to wealth 
effects. 
 
Hence, private consumption in period one, assuming for simplification sake that there are no 
current transfers, is a function of present and future disposable income, 
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 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1( ) (1 )(1 ) ( )
1
C Y T s Y T Y T
r
λ λ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − − + −⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦ , (6) 
 
with 10 << λ , and with the savings rate, s, also obeying 10 << s . The first term of the 
previous equation right-hand side represents the consumers that face liquidity constraints, 
while the second term of the right-hand side regards the consumers without liquidity 
constraints. In the presence of liquidity constraints, private consumption is the sum of 
consumption from liquidity-constrained consumers and consumption from non-constrained 
consumers.  
 
The effect on private consumption of a tax increase (see Appendix), noticing 
that 2 1/ (1 )T T r∂ ∂ = − + , may be derived as  
 
 N
N
1 2 2
2
1 1( )( )
( )( )
( )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
C Y Trs
T T r
λ λ
++
+−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞∂ −∂= − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
 	

	

. (7) 
 
Observe that the second term of the right-hand side of the previous equation has a positive 
sign, so that the sign of the derivative 11 / TC ∂∂  is undetermined, giving rise to the possibility 
for the existence of expansionary fiscal contractions.  
 
Defining z as the second term of the right-hand side of equation (7), then according to the 
magnitude of the z term, a tax increase may produce either a private consumption increase, 
the case where | z | > | λ |, or the usual Keynesian effect of decreasing private consumption, 
the case where | z | < | λ |. 
 
The model also allows the following results: 
 
i) There are no expansionary fiscal contractions when 1/ 0r T∂ ∂ = , in other words, in the 
absence of the risk-premium factor increasing in the budget deficit; 
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ii) If all consumers are rationed, λ = 1, fiscal policy will also have the usual Keynesian 
effects; 
 
iii) The higher the proportion of non-rationed consumers (the lower the value of λ) the higher 
the possibility of non-Keynesian effects; 
 
iv) When the interest rate is more responsive to changes in public revenues, implying a higher 
value for 1| / |r T∂ ∂ , and if not all consumers are rationed ( 1λ ≠ ), then more likely is the 
existence of fiscal policy non-Keynesian effects. 
 
Additionally, the effect on income of a change in tax revenues is obtained through the 
computation of
1
1
1
1
1
1
T
I
T
C
T
Y
∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
∂ . Considering also that 1 1
1 1
I I r
T r T
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂ , it is possible to write 
 
 
N N
1 2 2 1
2
1 1
( )( ) ( )
( )
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
Y Y T Ir s
T T r r
λ λ
−− +
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ − ∂∂ ⎢ ⎥= − + − − − +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ⎢ + ∂ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	

	

. (8) 
 
Using w as a notation for the second term of the last equation right-hand side, which again 
has a positive sign, we have 0/ 11 >∂∂ TY , the non-Keynesian effect, as a feasible result 
when ||  || λ>w . The previous conclusions concerning private consumption are also 
applicable in this case, in terms of the effects on income. 
 
Therefore, and as result of the two assumptions made above, the existence of liquidity 
constrained consumers, and the fact that the interest rate increasing in the budget deficit, a tax 
cut has an expansionary effect on the consumption level of credit-constrained consumers by 
raising their disposable income. On the other hand, the tax cut has a contractionary effect on 
the consumption level of the non-constrained consumers, since by worsening the fiscal 
balance of the country it also raises the risk premium component of the domestic interest rate, 
and thereby induces a negative wealth effect.  
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Depending on the relative strength of the two effects mentioned above, the expansionary 
(Keynesian) effect or the contractionary (non-Keynesian) effect would eventually prevail. For 
instance, the magnitude of the share of credit-constrained consumers in the economy 
increases the Keynesian outcome, while the responsiveness of the risk premium to the 
government fiscal balance increases the non-Keynesian effect allowing the possibility of 
expansionary fiscal contractions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper suggested an analytical textbook model with two periods for private consumption 
that comprises the possibility of both Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. 
The main features of the model are the relation between the interest rate and taxes and the 
existence of rationed consumers. On the one hand, it is assumed that a negative relation 
between the domestic interest rate and public revenues may exist, and put differently, a 
negative link between domestic interest rates and taxes is then suggested. On the other hand, 
it is also assumed that one of the standard conditions for Ricardian equivalence to occur is not 
met, with consumers facing liquidity constraints. 
 
One of the main conclusions of the paper is that when the domestic interest rate is more 
responsive to changes in government taxes, and if some part of the consumers is not credit-
constrained, then the existence of expansionary fiscal contractions is more likely. This 
captures the ambiguous effect of changes in taxes on consumption. Additionally, the bigger 
the proportion of non-rationed consumers the higher the possibility for the occurrence of non-
Keynesian effects, both on private consumption and on income. Alternatively, if all 
consumers face liquidity constraints then the usual Keynesian effects prevail. 
 
Therefore, the usually assumed positive correlation between private consumption and fiscal 
expansions may be reversed under some particular conditions, for instance, if consumers are 
forward looking and if they are not liquidity-constrained. Nevertheless, one should be careful 
in drawing strong policy conclusions on this issue since empirical and case study based 
assessments would always be advisable and required. 
 
 
 
 10
Appendix – Derivation of the results 
 
The effects on private consumption from a change in taxes are computed as  
 
 
2
2 2
1 11
2
1
(1 ) ( )
(1 )(1 ) 1
(1 )
T rr Y T
T TC s
T r
λ λ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥∂ ∂∂ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦= − + − − − +⎨ ⎬∂ +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
, (A1) 
  
 1 2 2 22
1 1 1
1(1 )(1 ) 1
1 (1 )
C T Y T rs
T r T r T
λ λ ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ − ∂⎪ ⎪= − + − − − + − −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥∂ + ∂ + ∂⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. (A2) 
 
Using the inter-temporal government budget constraint 
 
 
_
_
2 2
1 11 1
T GT G
r r
+ = ++ +  (A3) 
 
it is possible to write 
 
 2
1
(1 )T r
T
∂ = − +∂ . (A4) 
 
This result can then be substituted into (A2) 
 
 [ ]1 2 22
1 1
1(1 )(1 ) 1 1
1 (1 )
C Y T rs r
T r r T
λ λ ⎧ ⎫∂ − ∂= − + − − − + + −⎨ ⎬∂ + + ∂⎩ ⎭  (A5) 
 
in order to derive the effect on private consumption of a tax increase as presented in the text 
 
 1 2 22
1 1
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
C Y Trs
T T r
λ λ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤∂ −∂= − + − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ +⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ . (A6) 
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